Thursday, December 9, 2010

Wikileaks El Salvador III

The subject of the third Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "FMLN Affirms Socialist Course; Leadership Acknowledges Need for Strong Relations with U.S."  The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on December 15, 2009.

Here's the summary:
At its 25th annual convention December 13, the FMLN, without President Funes present, voiced solidarity with Cuba and Venezuela, repeated opposition to "the Empire," and voted to join the Fifth Socialist International. It decided to devolve authority to select candidates for local office to local party organizations. Senior FMLN leadership told us December 14 there had been no change in the FMLN's stated desire for good relations with the U.S. and attributed some of the anti-U.S. rhetoric by FMLN members (including VP Sanchez Ceren) to events outside of El Salvador, and an inability to adapt to new circumstances.
The cable starts off with a summary of the XXV 2009 Convention where the party reaffirmed its socialist platform.  That's nothing new (as I'll mention in the next post). 

Blau then goes on to summarize a meeting help between Embassy officials and FMLN representatives Medardo Gonzalez, Sigfrido Reyes, and Oscar Ortiz on December 14.
Medardo Gonzalez, FMLN General Coordinator and head of legislative bloc, Sigfrido Reyes, FMLN Spokesman and Assembly Deputy, and Oscar Ortiz, Santa Tecla Mayor. Gonzalez atated categorically there had been no change in the FMLN's stance of seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. Noting recent statements by VP Sanchez Ceren criticizing the U.S., the three were quick to say there was no anti-U.S. policy in the FMLN and, on the contrary, the FMLN and the Funes Government saw strengthening U.S.-Salvadoran relations as a priority.
In many ways, I think that the FMLN representatives are just telling the US Government what they want to hear.  The truth is that there is a split within the party.  There are some who see a strong relationship with the US as crucial to the stability and future of El Salvador while others see the FMLN's future aligned more closely with ALBA and other leftists governments in Latin America.  It's not uncommon for members of a political party to be divided on such issues of foreign and economic policy.  Granted, in the case of El Salvador, the polarization between parties (the FMLN and ARENA) and within parties (the FMLN) is a little more extreme than most. 

Ortiz explains that extreme rhetoric coming from the Convention and the VP as a reflection of some failing to adapt to new times.
Ortiz suggested much of the anti-Imperialist commentary still emanating from the FMLN was, in part, a function of the party's slow adaptation to a new world of governing and the difficulty of setting aside long-held political rhetoric.
I'm sorry, but this sure sounds like Villalobos and the ERP/RN cadre in the early to mid-1990s.

And the final comment from Blau
The FMLN's historic, guerrilla roots run deep, and the rhetoric of years on the battlefield and two decades in opposition will not disappear quickly, or maybe ever. While our outreach to the FMLN during the 2008-2009 campaign and since Funes' inauguration has paid off in open channels of communications, we continue to combat old suspicions of U.S. motives in El Salvador and the region. On the other hand, good relations with the U.S. enjoys a 90 percent approval rating. If the FMLN overdoes its radicalism, it will have a hard time sustaining its current electoral advantages.
Blau analysis seems accurate.  There are good reasons why the FMLN and the US government do not get along and the relationship might never improve to the extent the people of El Salvador and the US would like. 

However, the last sentence is a little difficult to understand without additional information.  I'm not sure what it would mean for the FMLN to overdo its radicalism - start nationalizing businesses and property?  emphasizing popular democracy?  strengthening ties with Communist Cuba and China?  joining ALBA? 

And with regards to "sustaining its electoral advantages,"  there is little that the FMLN can do in the next five to ten years that will cause it to lose enough popular support so that it is no longer the first or second largest party in the country.  I don't know, it's just not a really helpful insight.

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