A Non-aligned foreign policy in Nicaragua?

During the Cold War, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas stated that they intended to follow a non-aligned foreign policy. For some, a non-aligned foreign policy meant a policy of "equidistance" from both the Soviet and American empires. For others, a non-aligned foreign policy (consistent with the natural alliance tendency) viewed the world 

more along the lines of class analysis, in which the world is divided into imperialist, colonial and reactionary countries on one side and neo colonial, colonized and progressive countries on the other. From this perspective a natural alliance is seen between positions of the countries of the Non Aligned Movement and those of the socialist countries. This natural alliance is precisely that natural and therefore arises spontaneously and requires no formal structure. It sees the imperialism of the U.S. and its major allies such as Great Britain as the greatest threat to the development of the Third World. (Envio 1983)

While theoretically separate, the two visions were blurred in early revolutionary Nicaragua. The Sandinistas of 1979 and the early 1980s pursued both policies simultaneously. They requested and received aid from countries across the world (US, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and a variety of Latin American and European allies). The Sanindistas did not want to cut off relations with the United States. If anything they wanted more aid from the US to make up for being an "enemy of humanity." They increased trade with both democratic and non-democratic nations. They were neither in the Soviet nor the American camp.

At the same time, the Sandinistas were clearly more comfortable in the Soviet camp, improving the country's relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union and East bloc nations, Vietnam and revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements around the world. They criticize the imperialism of the United States, but not that of the Soviet Union. Inevitably, the non-aligned policy of equidistance from the US and Soviets gave way (if it ever really existed) to a non-aligned policy more consistent with the natural tendency.

In many ways, today, we see the same approach to Sandinista, or more accurately Ortega, foreign policy. Ortega's Nicaragua is a member of DR-CAFTA, a free trade agreement with the Dominican Republic, other Central American states, and the United States. Nicaragua is also a member of the Venezuelan and Cuban-led Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas (click here for an Americas Quarterly report on ALBA). While the stakes are not nearly as high as the Cold War, Ortega is again playing both sides.

There are a few potential scenarios which might affect Nicaragua's simultaneous participation in DR-CAFTA and ALBA. First, their might be a new occupant in the White House following the US presidential election in 2012. If the next US president takes a more hard-line approach to its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere (one that does not look kindly on Nicaragua's support for Chavez, Castro, Gadhafi, or Ahmadinejad), Ortega might be forced to choose. A second scenario might come from a deterioration in the relationship between the US and Venezuela. Recently, the US levied sanctions against Venezuela's state-run oil company, PDVSA. While the sanctions are relatively weak, it's not hard to imagine events spiraling out of control.

Finally, another scenario that could force Ortega to choose comes from his likely victory in next year's presidential election. A recent Nicaraguan poll, this one by New Century, has Daniel Ortega comfortably in the lead with 50% of the respondents in favor of reelecting Ortega. Ortega's support is up slightly from April's survey. While things could always change, there's a very good chance that Ortega will win another five-year term even though that constitution sure seems to have barred him from running.

Should Ortega need to manipulate the vote like he has been accused of in the past or have to send out his enforcers to break up anti-Ortega protests movements, one can see the US government take a stronger stance towards the Nicaraguan government. And like the Cold War, Nicaraguan will no longer be able to pursue a foreign policy that seeks to take advantage of what both the United States and Venezuela have to offer. And Nicaragua and Ortega will, in all likelihood, look south and choose a policy more consistent with the natural tendency vision of a non-aligned foreign policy.